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 In terms of relative power, there should be no question that Mexico is a candidate for inclusion
within the group of emerging powers or middle powers, given its territorial dimension, demogra-
phic characteristics, economic importance, geographic location, and relative weight in the Latin
American region.
 Yet, it has rarely behaved as such, sometimes assuming a ‘reluctant middle power position’. 
As Guadalupe González argues, ‘Mexico’s internationalism and multilateralism have been erratic
at best. Mexican political leaders have only occasionally defined the country as a middle-power
with a proactive global focus.1
 This is not to say that Mexico is indifferent towards global issues. Its diplomacy has been invol-
ved in all major multilateral and global negotiations. However, Mexico has been distinguished by
its cautious diplomacy and distaste for protagonist roles. In that sense, the country behaves as
an ‘unorthodox middle power’ at best, or a ‘reluctant middle power’ at worse2. Overall, Mexico is
essentially a system-cooperative actor or a status quo middle power, in the sense that it does not
promote a radical reform of the international order, nor does it actively engage in changing the
rules of the game.
 In the following lines we should focus on the reasons that explain Mexico’s reluctance to assu-
me a larger and more active role, one that is concomitant to its place and location in world poli-
tics. Throughout the different sections here presented, we will argue that in the past two deca-
des, Mexico has experienced systemic, regional and domestic transformations that have drastical-
ly changed the strategic environments in which its foreign policy has operated.
 Those changes included the end of bipolarity, the re-emergence of regionalism in the Hemis -
phere, and the democratisation of Mexican politics. To some extent, Mexico’s ambivalence in world
affairs is largely explained by the regional and domestic constraints it faces, stemming mostly from
the strong relationship it has with the US and the ambivalence of its domestic politics.
 In analysing Mexico’s role in global governance we will make use of the biennial survey con -
ducted by CIDE in 2004 and 2006, Mexico and the World3. This survey monitors Mexicans’ opini-
ons, outlooks, values, and general attitudes towards the world. While surveys do not necessarily
reflect the official policy, they do provide data as well as a snapshot that can help analyse and
assess Mexico’s foreign policy.
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GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
Mexico is a founding member of the International
 Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB.) Since the
1990s, it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO),
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Deve-
lopment (OECD), the Asian Pacific Economic Coope -
ration (APEC) mechanism, and signed more than 43
bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs).
Mexico also has a highly respected financial and eco-
nomic bureaucracy that has largely adhered to ortho-
dox macroeconomic policies. Many Mexicans have
held, or have aspired to, top positions in these inter-
national organisations. Antonio Ortiz-Mena, former
 Finance Minister in the 1970s, was President of the
IDB. José Angel Gurría, another former Finance Mini-
ster from the 1990s, is the current OECD Secretary
General. The current Finance Minister, Agustin Car-
stens, was the Deputy Managing Director of the IMF.
Hence, in theory, the country does have an explicitly
multilateral foreign policy to deal with economic
issues.
Furthermore, the Mexican public has largely favoura-
ble attitudes towards international economic instituti-
ons: on a scale of 0 to 100, with zero signifying ex-
tremely unfavourable feelings and 100 signifying ex-
tremely favourable feelings, Mexicans rated the World
Trade Organization at 69 in 2006, second only to the
United Nations (UN) (80) and slightly higher than the
ratings for the European Union (EU) and the Organi-
zation of American States (OAS.) Mexican opinion
 towards the International Monetary Fund is also posi-
tive. In 2004, it received a favourability score of 63,
slightly higher than the OAS, but significantly lower
than the ratings given to the UN (75).
However, Mexico has a strong bilateral economic
 relationship with its northern neighbour, the United
States (US), through institutions such as the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and it
tends to rely substantially on those bilateral instituti-
ons, too. Moreover, within the international political
economy organisations, Mexico has played a pivotal
role, not necessarily because of its initiative-oriented
position, but because it was the detonator site of two
major financial international crises in 1982 and in
1994, respectively, leading to an active intervention
of these very same international organisations. Con-
sequently, the relationship between Mexico and the
existing international economic organisations is a
 close one, but is subject to controversy, too.
Mexico’s Position on WTO and IMF
To date, Mexico is the 14th largest economy in the
world in terms of GDP, one of the largest oil produ-
cers and trading nations in the world, by far the most
important in Latin America. Currently, more than 70
per cent of its GDP derives from trade4. But Mexico is
a late-comer to the trade regime. It joined the GATT
in 1986 and became a full member of the WTO upon
its establishment in 1995.
Throughout its modern history (1945-1982), Mexico
had a closed economy, and its growth was dependent
mostly on oil exports. From the late 1940s until the
mid-1970s, the basic thrust of economic policy was
the use of high tariffs, import licensing requirements,
and foreign direct investment restrictions. A severe
downturn in 1982-1983 caused by a drastic drop in
the world price of oil and a rise in worldwide interest
rates forced Mexico to seek financial assistance from
the IMF. A second economic downturn in 1986 cou-
pled with a stock market crash and a devaluation of
the peso in 1987 and 1994 led to a second IMF inter-
vention, in which Mexico opened up its market unila-
terally, through its membership to GATT. Hence, the
relationship with the IMF and the WTO has grown
from necessity more than by choice, accompanied 
by economic crises and severe downturns.
The IMF intervention in the 1980-1990 period had
 important domestic consequences in both Mexico’s
economic institutions and its foreign policy. Perhaps
the most dramatic change was reflected in its bureau-
cratic organisation, whereby international economic
institutional relations are now coordinated and mana-
ged by mostly technocrats and economists as oppo-
sed to diplomats. While the Secretaría de Relaciones
Exteriores (or Ministry of Foreign Affairs) has a re-
sponsibility for managing Mexico’s relations with all
international organisations, leading roles are placed
by different Ministries depending on their compe-
tence.
The Banco de México (Federal Bank) and the Finance
Ministry are paramount in managing relations with
the IMF. The Ministry of Trade and Economics (also
known as Secretaría de Economía) is predominant
with the WTO. Because of the diverse nature of the
WB and IDB’s work, a variety of Ministries work in
tandem with these institutions, including the econo-
mics and finance ministries, the central bank, and 
the social development ministries. This has conse-
quences for Mexico’s foreign affairs, since its frag-
mented policy making means that the country rarely
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has a unified or homogenous position vis-à-vis eco -
nomic, trade, and financial issues. As Andrés  Rozental,
former deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs, argues:
Frequent differences arise between trade negotiators
and foreign policy operators which cannot be resolved
within a single ministerial structure and require arbi-
tration form a higher level. The problem is more acu-
te in the field, where trade offices separate from the
embassies have a tendency to operate on their own,
rather than under the overall supervision of the Fo-
reign Ministry5.
Reform Agenda from a Mexican Point of View
This does not necessarily mean that Mexico does not
favour some kind of reform within these organisati-
ons: Mexico has actively participated in international
committees charged with reforming the international
financial institutions following the Asian financial crises
and has been a leader in compliance with new data
reporting standards to the institutions. Yet, Mexico’s
behaviour in these organisations tends to be quiet
and institutional, rarely triggering international atten-
tion or promoting large coalitions for change. We refer
to this role as a system-cooperative actor.
For instance, the WB has been charging middle-
income countries higher interest rates on loans com-
pared to other lower-income countries (approximately
0.25 per cent higher.) To some extent, the WB is
 responding to the criticism, that its lending policies 
go to large middle-income countries that have access
to international capital markets rather than lending
more to the poorest countries. Mexico has opposed
these efforts to reduce WB lending to middle-income
countries, but it has done it quietly, without openly
opposing such reform.
Mexico’s opposition to such reforms stems from WB
grants via the International Finance Corporation (IFC)
that lends to private companies in developing coun-
tries. Private enterprises in Mexico have been large
beneficiaries of IFC lending. Supporting the reform of
the WB would imply that Mexico will pay less for the
social development and reform-oriented loans than 
its public sector receives from the WB itself.
The Trade Agenda
With regard to trade, Mexico’s overall aim is to con -
tribute to a more open, fair and stable international
system through the actions of the WTO, and at the
same time to ensure that the very significant gains it
has made through its FTAs are maintained. With that
goal in mind, Mexico hosted the Fifth Ministerial Con-
ference Meeting of the WTO in Cancún, in September
2003. There, it tried hard to push for launching a new
multilateral trade negotiation round, Doha; yet it fai-
led because of a stalemate between mostly developed
and developing states. Mexico has traditionally favou-
red a single undertaking given that, in its view, secto-
ral negotiations make compromise and side bargains
difficult. In terms of issues, Mexico believes that the
implementation of market access commitments in
agriculture and textiles has not translated into impro-
ved access for developing country exports; that spe-
cial and differential treatment for developing coun-
tries has not materialised in practice; and that legiti-
mate implementation difficulties by developing coun-
tries should be recognised and allowed for.
In theory, Mexico practices a multilateral policy to-
wards trade; however, in practice it relies heavily on
bilateral agreements to deal with its trade agenda. It
makes liberal use of the WTO’s permitted exception
to non-discriminatory trade policies through its net-
work of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Currently,
Mexico has free trade agreements with 43 countries;
no other country in Latin America has signed so many
of these bilateral trade commitments. In addition to
the US and Canada, Mexico’s network of agreements
stretches from Chile through Central America, to the
European Union, Japan and Israel. It is currently dis-
cussing preferential trading arrangements with South
Korea and other Asian countries. Mexico’s network of
FTA’s has helped to strengthen its position in a varie-
ty of international economic institutions and to play
an increasing leadership role in the international eco-
nomic system.
In spite of Mexico’s large network agreements and
linkage to the WTO, its trade relationships continue 
to rely heavily on the US and the NAFTA. In 1970 57
per cent of Mexican exports went to the US market;
by 2006 more than 86 per cent went to the North
American region. Hence, Mexico’s foreign trade de-
pendence and its foreign trade concentration with the
US have increased substantially. In that sense, Mexi-
co is currently much more concerned about the future
of NAFTA than it is about multilateral trade, because
there are far more stakes involved with its trade with
the US and Canada than with the rest of the world.
Declarations by US President-elect, Barack Obama,
regarding the renegotiation of NAFTA, have only in-
creased Mexico’s concerns about the future of North
American free trade. As we argued in our introducti-
on, Mexico’s role in international trade dynamics is
pretty much determined by the constraints it faces
vis-à-vis the US.
Mexico’s dependence on US trade does not mean that
Mexico is fully indifferent towards the WTO. However,
it is far less involved than Brazil in opening agricultu-
ral markets and eliminating subsidies within the WTO,
although it is greatly affected by agricultural policies,
since it is a net importer of grain and corn. Unlike
Brazil, Argentina or India, Mexico has a weak agricul-
tural sector and has unilaterally eliminated agricultu-
ral subsidies, an issue that has caused much dome-
stic tension among peasants since the 1980s, when 
it joined GATT. Most of its trade with the US takes
place in the form of services and manufactured
goods, which for the most part have been already
opened and negotiated through diverse GATT/WTO
rounds. It also imports most grains, including corn,
from its northern neighbour. Mexico is thus extremely
sensitive to US policies, because they might adversely
affect its regional and global preferences regarding
trade, even thought it believes that bilateral and mul-
tilateral trade liberalisation can be compatible.
Consequently, from this section, it is evident that Me-
xico has not shown the kind of strong internationalist
activism associated with the paradigmatic model of
emerging powers, despite its increasing integration to
the international economy. In sharp contrast to India
or Brazil, the importance of economic issues in Mexi-
co’s agenda has not integrated economic and foreign
policies, leading to increasing levels of compartmen-
talisation in the decision-making process. It is also
unclear whether Mexico uses its leverage and resour-
ces to implement an active reform role in world affairs.
For the most part, Mexico behaves like a status quo
outreach country and implements a mostly bilateral
agenda.
Alternative Regional Structures of Economic
 Governance
Alternatives to the IMF, the WB, and the IDB in Latin
America, such as Banco del Sur, are not supported by
the current Mexican government for a variety of rea-
sons. First, Banco del Sur was proposed by the Vene-
zuelan government with which Mexico has only in the
past months re-established full diplomatic relations
after a series of incidents during the previous admini-
stration. It is unlikely to enthusiastically sign on to
any project sponsored by an ideological rival with
which it has tense relations.
Second, Mexico has a relatively privileged position
within the existing international economic institutions
compared to most developing countries, including
those of Latin America. Although it would enjoy a
 relatively powerful position within any regional orga-
nisation, because of its size, it would be directly con-
fronted with rivalry from Brazil, on the one hand as
the region’s other large economy, and Venezuela, on
the other hand as the region’s largest cash spigot, 
at least as long as oil prices and Venezuelan oil pro-
duction remain at high levels. While Mexico’s foreign
policy seeks a leading role for Mexico in international
organisations, within Latin American institutions it
 generally seeks to be one among equals.
Third, although Mexico’s government is making its
 relations with Latin America a priority of its foreign
policy, after a significant deterioration in its regional
standing during the previous administration, it conti-
nues to emphasise its role as a bridge between North
and South America, and North and South more gene-
rally. Finally, its economic interdependence (or depen-
dence for that matter) with the US makes it unlikely
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that Mexico will support regional alternatives that
 either question standard economic policies or intend
to drive the US out of the region.
This policy appears to be supported by public opinion.
Surveys indicate that 41 per cent of Mexicans say
that their country should prioritise being a bridge
 between North America and South America, while
only 32 per cent want Mexico to prioritise integration
with South America and 18 per cent want integration
with North America to be a priority6.
Therefore, a regional financial institution that relega-
tes the IMF, the WB, and the IBD to secondary status
within the region would diminish Mexico’s influence
on international and regional financial and monetary
affairs. Mexico does not support the creation of alter-
native regional or international structures, although it
would not necessarily oppose the creation of comple-
mentary organisations.
Regional Arrangements of Economic Governance
One has to understand Mexico’s geographic dilemma,
which impedes the country from performing a larger
regional role. Mexico is clearly a member of the Latin
America community: it speaks the language, shares
their social difficulties, and is a constant cultural pre-
sence in Latin America. However, economically and
even politically speaking, the relationship with the
 region has been tepid at best.
Trade with Latin America forms a relatively insigni -
ficant part of Mexico’s total foreign trade. Mexican
 exports to the region were about 2.2 per cent of the
total exports in 2006, compared to 87 per cent of to-
tal exports that went to the US. Trade agreements
 signed with nine Latin American countries have been
largely symbolic and have not been beneficial for Me-
xico, since they have generated mostly deficits. Under
those circumstances, it does not seem realistic that
Mexico would assume an active role in promoting
 regional arrangements on global economic governan-
ce, at least not in Latin America as a whole, which en-
compasses a large universe of countries and enormous
variations within and across all nations. Latin America
is not a homogenous region and neither Mexico nor
Brazil can fully implement regional arrangements of
cooperation on their own.
Given this restriction, the economic relationship that
probably has some regional trends is that with Central
America. Potentially, Mexico could well serve as a
third-party between foreign aid donors and Central
America, since the country has technical expertise 
and knows the region like no other country in Latin
America. Some triangular cooperation agreements
have been formally signed between Japan’s aid
 agency (JICA), Mexico and Central America, mostly 
in the area of natural disaster relief funds, although
this is insignificant in terms of foreign aid and terms
of trade. Other initiatives, such as the Plan-Puebla-
 Panama, are facing the same fate (see section  below).
The most important institutions for Mexico are the 
WB, the IMF and NAFTA. While still very important, the
WTO is perhaps at a second level of importance, largely
because much of Mexican trade relations are conducted
under WTO exceptions through FTAs. Never theless,
 Mexico uses the dispute settlement mechanisms of
the WTO to resolve disputes with both its FTA partners,
when it cannot resolve the dispute through the FTA
mechanisms, and with other trading partners, parti -
cularly in anti-dumping and safeguard cases.
GLOBAL POLITICAL GOVERNANCE
Since its inception, the UN has always played an im -
portant role for Mexican foreign policy. As a founding
member of the UN, Mexico actively participated in the
San Francisco conference that led to the creation of the
world organisation. Mexico had fully committed  itself 
to the Allies’ effort during World War II, and its contri -
bution was rewarded in 1946, when the first  Security
Council (UNSC) meeting took place, in which both Brazil
and Mexico were the only representatives from Latin
America. Since 1946 the two states have participated in
all major UN bodies and have been among the world’s
major contributors to the UN  regular budget.
Likewise, public opinion in Mexico is quite favourable 
to the UN system. In fact, Mexicans feel more warmly
towards the UN than towards any other international
The informal sector still plays an important role in the economy 
of the emerging powers.
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 institution. From a scale of 0 (cold feeling) to 100 (very
warm feeling), the organisation that received the hig-
hest score was precisely the UN, with 75 points. When
asked how important the foreign policy goal of streng-
thening the UN should be, 60 per cent of the intervie-
wers believed that it should be a very important goal,
24 per cent said it should be somehow important, and
only 8 per cent thought it is not important at all7.
Mexican participation in the UN serves several foreign
policy goals: (1) to express a principled and mostly
legal view of world politics, (2) to reinstate its relative
political independence vis-à-vis the US, (3) to build
political coalitions with other partners outside Latin
America, and (4) to promote human rights and eco-
nomic development8.
With regards to the first goal, Mexico’s constitution
 places a special importance on multilateralism in the
constructive, effective, and legitimate, solutions of
 global order problems. The principles of the UN are
enshrined in Article 89 Section 10 of the Mexican Con-
stitution, including self-determination, non-intervention
in domestic affairs, peaceful settlement of disputes, the
prohibition of the threat or use of force in international
relations, and the sovereign equality of states. These
principles were adopted specifically from the UN Char-
ter and form the base of Mexican foreign policy. In that
sense, Mexico is a strong advocate of international pu-
blic law regulated by the UN and its bodies, specifically
the International Court of Justice (ICJ)9.
Second, politically speaking, the UN is Mexico’s pre-
ferred forum to exercise its relative independence
from its northern neighbour, the US. Throughout its
most recent participation in the UN Security Council
(UNSC) in 2002-2003, Mexico opposed US attempts
to authorise the use of force in Iraq. While this mea-
sure probably created political tension with Washing-
ton, it was applauded by a majority of Mexicans who
were against US overall policies in the Middle East.
This has led some scholars and foreign policy experts
to argue that Mexico should probably try to stay away
from the UNSC, because it puts the country in a po-
tential face-off with Washington10. According to this
view, Mexico simply cannot aspire to play a key role
in the UNSC, because in so doing it might find itself
opposing US global interests in issues such as nuclear
non-proliferation, peaceful settlement in the Middle
East, and terrorism. As Peter Smith describes, ‘Mexi-
co’s strategic position has been severely restricted by
the hegemonic power of the US. The simple fact is
this: Those places where Mexico might exert the most
impact are also well within the US sphere of influen-
ce, so Mexico’s performance as a pivotal state is con-
tinually subordinate to the overwhelming presence of
the US.’11 Nevertheless, Mexican diplomats believe the
risks are worth taking, because in so doing it might
offset the impression that the country has drifted away
from the UN because of NAFTA. Mexico sees the UN
as the solution to raw power politics. For this reason,
Mexico will join the UNSC again in 2009-2010. This
will only be the fourth time that Mexico serves in that
position, having served before in 1946, 1980-1981,
and 2002-2003.
In that sense, Mexico sees the UN as an important
vehicle to take a number of bilateral issues it has
with the US to a multilateral level. For instance,
being the country with a high rate of emigration,
Mexico perceives that its citizens are treated poorly
in the US. While migration is a bilateral matter bet-
ween these two neighbours, Mexico partially tries to
address the issue through the promotion of human
rights of migrants on the multilateral front. To give
an example, in 2004, Mexico sued the US at the UN
ICJ in The Hague, alleging systematic US violations
of notification obligations under the Vienna Conven -
tion on Consular Relations12.
Third, the UN is also a preferred forum to build rela -
tionships with countries located outside the Americas.
Mexican diplomats remain firmly attached to the no -
tion that participation in the UN enhances Mexico’s
voice opportunities, as it can relate to other conti-
nents. Unlike Brazil, Mexico has only a few embassies
in Africa and the Middle East, so its only diplomatic
 contacts with those regions tend to be channelled
through the UN system (see table below). In practice,
Mexico does not exercise what is often referred to in
the UN system as ‘capital-to-capital diplomacy’; that
is, diplomatic contacts between the world’s most im-
portant capitals to foster UN initiatives. Instead, Me-
xico’s efforts are concentrated in implementing fo-
reign policy through its UN contacts in the General
Assembly, where the G77 (of which Mexico has not
been a member since 1994) and the Non-Alignment
Movement (made up mostly of African and Asian
states) have a majority of votes. In other words, it
practices UN and multilateral diplomacy to foster
stronger bilateral relationships.
Fourth, Mexico perceives the UN as playing a con-
structive role in promoting development and human
rights. Having been a key actor as facilitator and the
host of the Conference of Financing for Development
(FfD) in Monterrey, in 2002, Mexico is actively invol-
ved in the FfD follow-up process. In particular, it pro-
motes the implementation of the commitments made
within the Monterrey Consensus, as well as the buil-
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ding of new bridges and initiatives to enhance their
impact on sustainable development. Likewise, Mexico
has actively participated in the creation of the Human
Rights Council (HRC) as a subsidiary body of the Ge-
neral Assembly (see section below for more informati-
on on Mexico’s position in human rights).
The UN Reform Agenda
Therefore, Mexico perceives the UN essentially as ser-
ving its multilateral and diplomatic policies. This does
not mean that the country does not promote change
within the UN. In fact, Mexico has become more pro-
active in the UNSC since 2003, although it continues
to debate its role as a non-permanent member. Parti-
cularly sensitive to Mexico is the attempt by the G4
(Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan) to modify the
structure of the UNSC by including more permanent
members. Mexican diplomats have expressed their
 total rejection of such an initiative and have encoura-
ged the creation of ad hoc groups to prevent the G4
from achieving their goals. In particular, Mexico is
 opposed to having Brazil as a permanent member for
the Latin American region, thus creating some diplo-
matic tension and rivalry with the Southern Cone
country. Instead, Mexico favours a reform of the UNSC
that leads to the inclusion of more non-permanent
members for a longer period of time and with the
possibility of re-election.
Mexico’s diplomacy believes that introducing the
 principle of re-election for non-permanent members
would allow a more continuous presence in the UNSC
of countries that are willing to play an active role in
the international agenda, and at the same time it
would guarantee their accountability and transparen-
cy13. In order to prevent the G4 from achieving its
goals, Mexico’s previous president, Vicente Fox, invited
a group of fourteen similarly minded countries (Algeria,
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Spain,
Japan, Kenya, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Pakistan,
Singapore and Sweden) to form a new grouping, called
‘Friends for the Reform of the United Nations’. Its offi-
cial objective is that of formulating substantive propo-
sals for the UN reform process as well as designing a
diplomatic strategy to push for the evolution of the
UN system. However, it was also seen as a group of
countries openly  opposed to the G4. The group has
submitted documents to the General Assembly and
Secretary- General of the UN and continues to work
together on an ad-hoc basis on reform issues. The
reform  initiative of the previous government continues
to enjoy the support of the current government of
 Felipe Calderon as well as generalised support by the
major political parties.
Informal Global Governance
Mexico sees the G8, the G77 and the G20 as signifi-
cant organs of global governance, but certainly not  
as a replacement for the UN or WTO in any sense.
Smaller groupings can arrive at consensus position
more easily than universal membership institutions
and facilitate bargaining within the traditional inter -
national organisations. As such, they give Mexico the
opportunity to have a greater influence on issues of
global governance than within the cacophony of voi-
ces present in international organisations. But Mexico
is cautious about the role of such groups and at times
has withdrawn from such organisations. For instance,
Mexico was one of the founding members of the G77
and led it twice; first under President Luis Echeverría,
in 1974-1975, and again under President de la Ma-
drid, in 1983-1984. However, Mexico withdrew from
the G77 when it entered the OECD in 1994. These
mechanisms have not proved to be exceptionally 
far reaching. The vast diversity of countries in these
groups has allowed Mexico to reach at best extremely
general agreements. Frequently, these forums merely
reflect agreements already bargained and negotiated
in established organisations, such as the UN.
Multilateral and Bilateral Cooperation
While the Mexican public strongly supports the princi-
ple of multilateralism, as evidenced by the importan-
ce it places in strengthening the UN, Mexicans also
demonstrate some ambivalence in their support for
multilateralism in action. About 46 per cent of the
 public said that when dealing with international pro-
blems, Mexico should be willing to make decisions
within the UN, even when this means that their coun-
try will sometimes have to go along with a decision
that it would not have preferred. By contrast, 27 per
cent disagreed with making decisions on international
problems within the UN and 19 per cent said that 
‘it depends’. However, Mexicans are just as wary of
 bilateral decision-making, at least when it involves
the US. While 42 per cent agreed with joint decision-
 making with the United States to resolve common
problems, 31 per cent disagreed and 18 per cent 
said that ‘it depends’14.
For the Mexican government, multilateralism is 
the best means to reduce dominance by the most
powerful countries. Multilateralism is thus perceived
as a means to reduce the heavy burden imposed by
its bilateral relationship with the US. In other words,
multilateralism and the UN system are consciously
developed further to balance and compensate for the
close bilateral and somehow dependent relationship
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with Washington. As argued before, Mexico has often
tried to take certain issues to a multilateral level,
 although that have been traditionally subject to the
bilateral agenda, for instance immigration.
However, Mexico’s political independence is only relati-
ve and the country’s multilateral orientation is perhaps
strongest on political and security-related issues and
weakest on economic-related issues. Mexico will rarely
openly divert from US positions, unless it has the po-
pular support of domestic audiences, as happened du-
ring the 2003 Iraq crisis in the UNSC. Moreover, Mexi-
co has always pursued an explicitly bilateral trade poli-
cy through its network of FTA’s. Trade is the one issue
that remains highly bilateral in Mexico’s agenda15.
Consequently, Mexico is an archetypical model of a
country that engages in forum shopping and multila-
teralism, in the sense that Mexican diplomacy selects
and discriminates among overlapping multilateral in-
stitutions in deciding where to implement its policies.
Depending on the case and the forum, Mexico will go
unilateral,  bilateral (as in trade issues), multilateral
(as in human rights) or both bi and multilateral (as 
in immigration).
Relations with Emerging Countries
Mexican government policy is not adverse to strategic
partnerships among emerging countries, but not in 
an attempt to create distinct institutions which would
operate independently from the traditional internatio-
nal institutions. One key aspect of this strategy is to
position Mexico as a bridge between the South and
the North, through membership in organisations such
as the OECD and NAFTA. For instance, at the UN Me-
xico forms part of the Group of Latin American and
Caribbean Countries (GRULAC). Unlike all other GRU-
LAC members, Mexico, which joined the OECD in
1994, does not belong to the G77. Mexico sees this
as a privileged, independent position and likes to
think of itself as a mediator between industrialised
and developing countries.
However, in practice, this self-image as a ‘bridge
 between the North and South’ has its limitations and
appears to be merely aspirational. If anything, Mexi-
co’s strategy to portray itself as a bridge has failed 
as a policy, because the country has not been percei-
ved as such by Latin America or any other developing
nation. With the mere exception of Central America,
Mexico City
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Mexico has failed to play the bridge role effectively 
or successfully. Quite the opposite, Mexico has been
 excluded from recent political projects, such as the
South American Community of Nations. Brazil has
 often portrayed Mexico as a country that belongs to
the North, not solely in terms of geographic location,
but also in terms of its foreign relations.
Mexico’s relations with the other G5 countries have
been relatively limited, but friendly, except in the
case of Brazil, with which it has a much more com-
plex, long-standing relationship. Nevertheless, Mexi-
co’s efforts to reach out to other countries are limited
by the small network of embassies abroad. The Can-
cillería (or Ministry of Foreign Affairs), which is usual-
ly underfunded because of the strong federal, bureau-
cratic fights for resources and budgets, has had to
use its limited assets to support Mexican diasporas,
while overlooking other foreign policy issues. Mexico’s
support of its diaspora is administered through a lar-
ge network of forty-seven Mexican consulates in the
US, the world’s largest network of consular repre -
sentations in America. All of these consular offices
 sustain various projects directly targeting the Mexican-
American community, such as buttressing community
organisations, promoting formal education program-
mes in Spanish for US state schools, arranging mee-
tings with leaders of immigrant clubs and Mexican
 politicians, and fostering various cultural and folklore
programmes to enhance ‘Mexicanness’ (mexicani-
dad)16.
Hence, Mexican diplomacy is often driven by the de-
mands of diasporas, who are becoming increasingly
visible in both the US and Mexican politics. This has
important consequences for Mexico’s foreign affairs,
since the country has almost as many consulates 
in the US as embassies abroad (63 consulates, of
which 47 are in the US, and 70 embassies world -
wide). Staff members, resources, money and infra-
structure go directly into North American consular
offices, while diplomatic missions in Africa, Asia, and
Europe are underfunded and understaffed. In some
cases, it is more costly to maintain a consulate in a
US city than an embassy in Africa or Asia. In some
regions, such as Africa, Mexico has barely four em-
bassies, leaving Mexican diplomacy with no formal
links or networks with the strong African community.
Consequently, while Mexico does have relationships
with countries such as India, South Africa or China,
its diplomacy is limited in scope, as it cannot practi-
ce a more global and active foreign policy, like Brazil
or India.
Embassies and Consulates Abroad: 
Brazil and Mexico in Comparative Perspective
Source: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores de México
(Cancillería mexicana) and Ministério das Relações
Exteriores do Brasil (Itamaraty), 2006.
Diplomatic relations with China, India and Brazil are
essentially issue-driven. For instance, bilateral trade
issues dominate Mexico’s relations with China, with
the former accusing the latter of dumping a variety of
goods on its domestic markets, increasing the trade
deficit. China has now replaced Mexico as the US’s
second-largest trading partner.
In the international security sphere, Mexico and China
are frequently in agreement on intervention, with both
countries sharing the principle of non-intervention as
pillars of their foreign policy. Mexico does not support
Japan’s candidacy for a permanent seat in the UNSC,
opening future areas of political agreement between
China and Mexico.
In Mexican public opinion, China is overall well percei-
ved: when asked to rate their feelings toward a list of
sixteen countries on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 mea-
ning extremely unfavourable feelings, 50 meaning neit-
her favourable nor unfavourable, and 100 meaning ex-
tremely favourable, the average rating by the general
public for China was 66, fifth on the list after Canada,
the United States, Australia, and Japan, and ahead of
Brazil, which scored 57, and India which scored 51.
Embassies in: Brazil Mexico
Latin America and the Caribbean 25 23
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Nevertheless, Mexicans are unsure about whether
 China’s rise is a good or bad thing. When asked if
 China’s economy were to grow as large as that of the
US, would this be seen as mostly positive, mostly ne-
gative, or neither positive or negative, 38 per cent of
the public said that it would be mostly positive, 38 per
cent said that it would be mostly negative, and 16 per
cent said it would be neither positive nor negative.
Leader’s feel strongly that China’s rise would be mostly
negative, 60 per cent responded mostly negative while
only 22 per cent responded mostly positive17.
On the other hand, relations with India used to be
closer, when Mexico led the G77 and when the two
developing countries were leaders of the Six Nations for
 Disarmament in the 1980s (which included Argentina,
Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania). Indian-
Mexican bilateral exchanges, especially within the UN
system, were far more common in the 1970s and
1980s. Mexico’s active role in promoting nuclear dis -
armament and non-proliferation decreased overtime,
while India assumed a quite different role by becoming
an overt nuclear power a few years ago, thus reducing
cooperation levels among both countries in the area of
non-proliferation. Mexico supported sanctions on India,
when it tested a nuclear bomb in 1998. It also opposes,
albeit quietly, the recent US-India nuclear agreement,
because of its exceptions to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, which Mexico strongly supports. Mexico is now
looking at India with a far more economic interest in
mind, evidenced by the recent visit of President Felipe
Calderon to South Asia. Discussions between the lea-
ders of the two countries focused on increasing bilateral
trade and investment. Unlike China, Indian exports
do not directly compete with Mexico’s either in the
domestic market or in the US market, making pro-
gress on trade and investment relatively easier.
Similarly, Mexico’s relations with South Africa are
 extremely limited. Although it maintains an embassy
in South Africa, it is one of only three in sub-Saharan
Africa, and it is responsible for five other countries in
the region. Trade and investment between the two
countries is negligible, at best.
Conversely, Mexico’s relations with Brazil have a lon-
ger and more complicated history. In short, the two
countries are friendly ‘brother’ nations in Latin Ame -
rica, but as the two largest economies in the region,
they, at times compete for influence both in Latin
America and in the international economic and politi-
cal system. Trade between Mexico and Brazil is limi-
ted, but the two countries are direct competitors for
many products in the US market, and they also com-
pete for foreign investment within the region. Some
Mexican multinationals have large investments in
 Brazil, particularly in the telecommunications sector.
Brazilian investment in Mexico is much more limited.
Mexico has been more of a status quo country with
respect to traditional international organisations, whi-
le Brazil has been more supportive of creating alter-
native institutions to complement existing institutions,
and it even advocates for radical reforms, both in the
WTO and the UNSC. Brazil also has more of a vocati-
on for seeking to exercise political and security lead-
ership in the region and endeavours to be the Latin
American representative on the world stage. Mexico 
is more ambivalent about leading the region or repre-
senting the region in the political and security sphe-
res, although it fiercely defends its leadership ambiti-
ons in the international sphere. In 2005, both coun-
tries clashed diplomatically in the UN system, when
Brazil explicitly tried to become a permanent member
of the UNSC, much at the expense of Mexico. Since
then, Mexico has built its UN diplomacy in a way that
challenges Brazil’s dominance at the UN. Hence, Me-
xico will be in the UNSC again in 2009-2010, coinci-
ding with Brazil, who will also serve as a non-perma-
nent member in 2010-2011. This will be the first time
that the two Latin American giants will coincide in the
UNSC since 1946: This may open the door for increa-
sed diplomatic interaction between the two countries,
but it could also lead to more direct confrontations on
leadership roles.
In spite of their mutual competition, Brazil and Mexico
have recently explored different mechanisms to ex-
pand their economic ties. Mexico is now seeking Brazi-
lian investment in the area of oil exploration through a
joint venture between PEMEX and PETROBRAS, since
the latter is an innovator in deep water drilling. Howe-
ver, these investment projects will depend on the suc-
cess of the oil sector reform in Mexico, which at the
present time restricts foreign investment.
The Mexican public judges Mexico’s relations with
Brazil to be that of friends, rather than as partners,
rivals or threats. 53 per cent said that Mexico and
Brazil were friends, compared to 30 per cent who said
the two countries were partners, while 4 per cent said
that the countries were rivals and 2 per cent saw
 Brazil as a threat18.
Regional Governance
Mexico has, like Brazil to some extent, serious diffi-
culties in implementing regional coordination mecha-
nisms. First, in the Latin American region, Mexico has
played a pivotal role in creating and fostering coordi-
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nation groups, such as the Condadora Group in 1983,
the Rio Group in 1986, and the foundation of the
 Ibero American Summit in 1991. Yet, as Olga Pellicer
argues, ‘the vast diversity of countries in the region
has allowed them to reach at best extremely general
agreements that reflect a minimal common denomi-
nator.’19
Second, the relationship between Mexico and Latin
America, as well as that between Brazil and the re -
gion itself, now faces obstacles derived from the
 growing ideological diversity and rivalry. Brazil and
Mexico can do very little to control Venezuela’s Hugo
Chávez’ radicalism, and the gap separating the pro-
Chávez countries (Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua)
from the anti-Chávez regimes (Colombia) is increa-
sing and causing much political tension that probably
requires a third-party intervention from outside the
region.
Third, unlike Western Europe within the EU frame-
work, Latin America is not a homogenous regional
 entity. Attempts to coordinate the region are condem-
ned to failure, because of the diversity and hetero -
geneity of interests, policies, stakes and perspectives.
On the one hand, the Southern Cone of South Ameri-
ca is perhaps the most cohesive sub-area in Latin
America, with Mercosur playing a small role in foste-
ring integration. But even in that sub-area there are
serious challenges posed by Venezuela’s recent mem-
bership to Mercosur and by the lack of free trade poli-
cies practiced by some of its members, including Bra-
zil. On the other hand, the Andean countries in South
America are facing serious dilemmas posed by ideolo-
gical rivalries between Colombia and Venezuela (with
the US affecting the security complex), and by the in-
creasing role of drug trafficking and organised crime.
Finally, Central America is lagging behind most eco-
nomic development indicators (with the exception of
Costa Rica), while crime and domestic violence are
imposing serious governance challenges. Therefore,
not only is the region heterogeneous, but its problems
and challenges with regards to governance are quite
different between sub-regions and across countries.
Clearly, countries such as Brazil or Mexico cannot by
themselves coordinate efforts to overcome such diver -
sity of interests and problems.
Fourth, a regional coordination function is also depen-
dent on US leadership. There is very little Brazil or
Mexico can do without US intervention. Even Brazil’s
most recent UN peacekeeping participation in Haiti is
channelled by US interests in the region. Under such
circumstances, it is extremely difficult to foster regio-
nal powers, because the US is the de facto hegemon
of the region. Ultimately, Washington plays the role
of regional leadership, at times facilitating coopera -
tion, although often causing more problems than
 posing solutions, as evidenced by the failure of Plan
Colombia.
Hence, regional powers are unlikely to exercise coor-
dination functions in Latin America. At best, Mexico
has paid greater attention to the problems posed by
certain specific countries and sub-regions, such as
Central America, Guatemala, Cuba, and to some
 extent Chile. However, none of these instances has
generated a true strategic alliance, conceived as a
programme for political cooperation and orchestration
with the ability to generate substantive and consistent
benefits for all parties. Plans for a strategic alliance
with Chile, with whom Mexico has strong political and
economic affinities, given their pro-free trade ap-
proach, have been derailed by Mexico’s opposition 
to support a Chilean candidate for the OAS Secretary
General position.
INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL ORDER
While Mexico probably shares the vision of the impor-
tance of international development cooperation, it
does not give it high priority, relative to other foreign
policy goals. Helping to improve the standard of living
in less developed countries ranked tenth on a list of
thirteen foreign policy goals perceived to be very im-
portant for the general public20.
Having said that, Mexico’s priorities in this sphere are
the issues of migration and the human rights of im-
migrants. There are approximately ten million Mexi-
cans living in the US, roughly half of whom are un -
documented, and Mexico is a firm defender of their
rights. This priority is reflected not only in relations
with the US, but also in Mexico’s emphasis on this
 issue in many international forums.
Similarly, perhaps moved by its very own democratic
transition in 2000, human rights are now a salient
political issue in Mexico. The country has become an
active promoter and founding member of the new UN
Human Rights Council (HRC). Mexico was elected as a
member of the Council for the 2006-2009 period, and
then presided it during its first year of operation, in
2006-07. Under its presidency, the Council submitted
to the General Assembly the Convention for the Pro-
tection of all Persons from Forced Disappearance and
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indi-
genous Peoples. Mexico favours strengthening the
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HRC as the organ par excellence entrusted with pro-
moting and protecting human rights worldwide. This
position has led the Mexican delegation to the UN to
favour resolutions that have condemned countries 
like Cuba for their human rights record, leading to 
a serious diplomatic stalemate with the Caribbean
country in 2006.
The Role of the Existing Institutions in Social
 Governance Questions
In terms of labour and environmental issues, Mexico
accepts the need for their discussion, but it is oppo-
sed to formal commitments within the realm of the
WTO that would result in disguised protectionism by
developed countries. It thus considers that those
 issues must be dealt with through the International
 Labour Organization and the UN World Environment
Programme21.
Mexico places paramount importance on the role of
the UN as evidenced by its hosting of the Summit and
its commitment to the Millennium Development Agen-
da in Monterrey in 2003. In all matters of internatio-
nal cooperation, the UN is the most important organi-
sation in which Mexico acts. The International Labour
Organization has a lesser role; although it is a large
contributor to the organisation, Mexico has not parti-
cipated actively in recent years.
Fulfilling Commitments on the Social Agenda
Mexicans like the idea of multilateralism and of Mexi-
co being a good international citizen. For instance,
when asked what Mexico should do regarding coun-
tries that do not respect human rights, 58 per cent
said that Mexico should advocate that international
organisations, such as the UN, censor such violations.
They do not necessarily agree with living up to such
commitments. When asked if they agree or disagree
that Mexicans who have been accused of crimes against
humanity, such as genocide and torture, should be tried
in the International Criminal Court, 42 per cent agreed,
43 per cent disagreed and 9 per cent said that ‘it
 depends’22.
Since the arrival of democracy in 2000, the govern-
ment has made compliance with international human
rights commitments a top priority in its foreign policy.
Efforts are being made to harmonise existing local,
state and federal legislation with international human
rights obligations. It is also taking actions to imple-
ment recommendations made by international organi-
sations, including those of the UN and Inter-American
systems, to eliminate racial discrimination, to protect
the human rights of all migrants, including foreign
workers in Mexico, to eliminate torture, and to pro-
tect the rights of children.
Nevertheless, Mexico still has a mixed record on com-
plying with its international commitments in the social
sphere, particularly in dealing with torture and treat-
ment of journalists23. The deterioration of Mexico’s
public security has led to serious violations of human
rights, as the army has occupied police stations in se-
veral cities that were once taken by organised crime.
If anything, Mexico’s position in the UN should serve
to foster the human rights agenda at home, but there
are few signs of improvement.
Mexico is officially committed to opening itself to
 international scrutiny with regard to human rights
and to constructive cooperation with international
 organisations on this issue. Equally important is the
fact that a vast network of NGO’s already exists in
 Mexico dealing essentially with human rights and
 environmental protection. Likewise, Mexico currently
maintains a policy of openness and cooperation with
the international human rights mechanisms and
organi sations. It has extended an invitation to the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to visit 
the country. As of to date, Mexico has received 11
visits from the UN special representative for human
rights and 7 visits from Inter-American procedures.
Nevertheless, the country is still lagging behind 
in complying with all international human rights
 regulations.
Mexico does actively support the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, which is an autonomous judicial in-
stitution of the Inter-American system, established in
1979 with the purpose of enforcing and interpreting
the provisions of the American Convention on Human
Rights. Mexican jurists have served as judges in the
Court; while the latter has ruled on specific cases of
human rights violations in Mexico. Hence, the coun-
try does grant ample jurisdiction to the Court itself.
But when it comes to promoting initiatives, Mexico
prefers to deal with human rights issues in the global
arena, often discriminating against other regional
 forums.
Mexico is also a signatory to the Kyoto Agreement
and an active participant in international environ -
mental issues, albeit always with the caveat that
 developing countries should benefit from interna -




The administration, the foreign policy bureaucracy, and
the opposition parties in Mexico have not yet worked
out a strategy on Mexico’s vision for its own future:
Mexico could be a leader in the economic sphere, due
to its size and trading patterns. Mexico also has taken
on responsibilities in international jurisprudence and
nuclear non-proliferation, two traditional areas of
 emphasis in Mexican foreign policy. However, there  
is great reticence about involvement in international
 security issues, beyond non-proliferation. Furthermore,
 because Mexico borders the US, has millions of its citi-
zens living there and relies on its trade and investment
flows, its responsibility in the international sphere runs
the risk of damaging its relations with Washington.
This reticence is evidenced by Mexico’s limited partici-
pation as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, whe-
re many fear it may be forced to take positions on is-
sues that go against the interests of the US, and which
may cause problems in its bilateral relations in parts of
the world where Mexico has very limited interests.
Consequently, Mexico tends to operate primarily as
an economic actor, even on issues that are largely
political or deal with international security. For instan-
ce, according to the Global Policy Forum, in 2006,
Mexico was the tenth largest financial contributor to
the UN system, with US$ 32 million , accounting for
1.82 per cent of all the assessment. In fact, Mexico 
is the largest contributor from Latin America and the
Caribbean, providing 52 per cent of the region’s quo-
ta. Likewise, Mexico is among the 15 largest financial
donors to the UN peacekeeping (PK) budget, contri-
buting more than US$ 25 million in 200524.
Therefore, Mexico is a responsible and generous finan-
cial contributor and will rarely miss its quota. It uses its
economic leverage to play in the UN system. Yet, its UN
behaviour has been somehow ambivalent and erratic,
because it rarely participates actively in collective securi-
ty and UN peacekeeping. For decades, Mexico abstained
from participating in the UNSC because of its concentra-
tion of power vis-à-vis the General Assembly (GA) and
because it did not want to openly disagree with the US
(especially during the Cold War era). While the country
has become a more proactive non-permanent member in
the UNSC, there is still wide resistance among the gene-
ral public to engage in collective security.
The debate regarding Mexico’s role in the UNSC is also
convoluted by the fact that the country has a bureau-
cratic setting that impedes an active role. For instan-
ce, in 2001, when Mexico made official its intention to
serve in the UNSC, the Cancillería was hindered by
other federal bureaucrats who overall disagreed with
the policy. As a diplomat involved in the process
 argued, ‘we needed to rectify a position given the
transition to democracy…we needed to express com-
mitment and international credibility.’25 Nevertheless,
the Finance and Economics ministries opposed relea-
sing funds to bargain for votes in the UN, arguing
that such policy would create unintended consequen-
ces, such as having small countries permanently de-
manding aid, whenever Mexico would join an interna-
tional body. The finance establishment then success-
fully lobbied the executive branch and convinced the
President to abstain from granting funds, debt relief
and foreign aid to Mexico’s allies in the UN. In the
 absence of substantial ‘carrots’ for bargaining, Mexico


















UN Regular Budget Payments of Largest Payers,
2006
Source: Global Policy Forum, www.globalpolicy.org/
 finance/tables/reg-budget/large06.htm
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Assembly and had to go for a second round against
the Dominican Republic, which almost won as many
votes as the Mexican delegation. In the end, Mexico
did prevail in the second round of votes, not without
a sour note, given the lack of support provided by the
Finance Ministry itself. The Foreign Ministry is thus
unable to mobilise on its own a candidacy for a non-
permanent seat in the UNSC, unless it has explicit
support from the finance and economics ministries.
This has happened occasionally, as in 1980 and in
2008, when Mexico announced its candidacy for the
2009-2010 period. It is not that bureaucrats in the
economic sector reject international activism per se;
instead they prefer to be actively involved in other
 international economic bodies, such as the WTO and
the Bretton Woods system, where not only the econo-
mic benefits are more tangible, but the policies are
dictated by them and not by diplomats.
Mexico and Brazil in the UN System
Source: Global Policy Forum, www.globalpolicy.org/ finance/tables/reg-budget/large06.htm
MEXICO BRAZIL
Contribution to regular UN budget (2005) $33.5 million (2006) $26 million
UNSC non-permanent member 1946, 1980-81, 2002-03, 1946-47, 1951-52, 1954-55,
candidate for 2009-2010 1963-64, 1967-68, 1988-89,
1993-94, 1998-99, 2004-05,
candidate for 2010-2011.
Contribution to UN PK (2006) $25 million 1,217 troops, 10 police,
0 peacekeepers 30 military observers (13th. from top)
Important UN posts Alicia Bárcena Ibarra, Luiz Carlos da Costa,
UN Under-Secretary-General Deputy Special Representative
for Management, Bernardo of SG for Operations in Liberia;
Sepúlveda, ICJ Judge; Paulo Sergio Pinheiro,
María Elena Medina Mora, Special Rapporteur on Human
Board of Narcotic Control; Rights in Myanmar,
Griselda García, Intergover. Fernando Henrique Cardoso,
Committee for Safeguarding of Chair of the Panel on
Cultural and Tangible Heritage, UN-Civil Society Relations
UNESCO.
Membership in UN Conference on Disarmament, Peacebuilding Commission,
Commissions and Human Rights Council, Law Commission, Human
Committees UNESCO Executive Council, Rights Council, Governing
Int. Seabed Council, UN Commission Council UNEP, Conference
on International Trade Law on Disarmament.
Number of NGOs 15 (out of 3,051) NA
registered with ECOSOC
(consultative status or on roster)
Number of NGOs  13 (out of 1,664) 6 (out of 1,724)
registered with DPI
Number of registered 26 (out of 334) 24 (out of 321)
partnerships with Commission 
for SustainableDevelopment




Mexico does not have significant hard power in the
international political arena. Although Mexico has
 Latin America’s second largest military force, after
Brazil, it spends less than one per cent of its GDP on
its armed forces. Likewise, the military has never had
the appetite to project power abroad, because since
World War II Mexican soldiers have not dealt with
any concrete external military enemies. Mexico is too
small to fight a war against the US and too big to do
battle with its small southern neighbours.
Even if the large border with the US is increasingly
problematic, due to drug trafficking and now terro-
rism, the peril is seen as consisting not in the ex -
treme event of an armed invasion, but in the daily
 socio-economic interaction with the northern and
powerful neighbour. The idea of deploying a large
number of soldiers to UN operations is troubling for
the Ministry of Defence, because these are not seen
as part of their domestic missions. Thus, Mexico has
made a strategic decision to de-emphasise traditional
hard political power.
Indicators of Power for Brazil and Mexico in
 Comparative Terms, 2006
Source: The World Bank Group Data Query, World
Bank, 2006. http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-
 query/; Jane’s Sentinel for Central America and South
America 2006, IIS-Military Balance 2005-2006)
Unlike the other G5 countries, such as China and In-
dia, Mexico has rarely used its military might to serve
international purposes. There are a number of dome-
stic and international reasons that explain Mexico’s
lack of interest in world military affairs.
First, Mexico has been extremely sensitive to external
interference in its internal affairs, with a traditional
distrust of the US and a defensive position regarding
its sovereignty. This makes deep military cooperative
efforts very controversial. Mexico is not a member of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and it
is opposed to joining the US Northern Command. The
country is currently engaged in discussions with the
US and Canada with the Alliance for Security and Pro-
sperity in North America (ASPAN). Mexico wants to
deepen its security cooperation with its North Ameri-
can partners, with a large caveat related to its fer-
vent defence of its national sovereignty.
While Mexico’s government and its public share many
of the same threat perceptions related to security
 issues as do the US government and the American
public, in many ways its cooperation within ASPAN
 reflects its desire not to see the US security perimeter
drawn at the Mexican border, because of potential
disruptions in the growing economic integration bet-
ween the two countries. Mexico thus cooperates on
security issues with the US, only when its trade inte-
rests are threatened by Washington’s security agen-
da. Mexico will not, however, support any engage-
ment or commitment beyond ASPAN, such as suppor-
ting peace missions in Afghanistan.
Second, Mexico’s hesitance to engage its armed
 forces in missions abroad is also driven by domestic
considerations, particularly the evolving nature of civil-
military relations and the complex bureaucratic decision-
making process. In Mexico there is bureaucratic com-
petition and a division of labour between the Cancille-
ría and the Ministry of Defence that goes back to the
1930s. In 1929, when the Revolutionary Institutional
Party (PRI) was founded, a pact was agreed between
soldiers and civilians, whereby the former accepted
the demilitarisation of politics and the latter conceded
institutional autonomy. This pact facilitated the divisi-
on of labour and made possible the emergence of a
consensus, placing special emphasis on civi lian supre-
macy, since there was nothing above the  official par-
ty. By 1946, when the first civilian president was elec-
ted, the military institution had not only been unified
and disciplined, but had also been successfully subor-
dinated to civilian power. In exchange, the armed for-
ces were given institutional autonomy to decide pro-
motions, doctrine, strategy, and of course, military
INDICATORS OF 
HARD POWER BRAZIL MEXICO
GNP (in US$ billions) 794,098 785,468
GNP per capita 3,460 7,310
Foreign direct investment 
(in US$ billions) 18.2 17.4
Population 
(millions of inhabitants) 186.1 106.2
Exports measured as 
a % of GNP 22.7 29.9
Exports (in US$ billons) 96.4 189.
Number of armed forces 
personnel 302,909 192,770
Armed forces per 
1,000 inhabitants 1.8 1.8
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operations26. As a result of this pact, the Mexican armed
forces have their own domestic priorities and have suf-
ficient institutional autonomy to craft their own missi-
ons. Since the military was not in power during the PRI
era, the democratisation of Mexican politics in 2000 did
not modify the civil-military pact itself, it simply altered
party politics, but not  civil-military relations.
The Mexican armed forces’ approach regarding securi-
ty is, for practical purposes, an exclusive doctrine of
national security. Indeed, the rationale and justificati-
on that drives the Mexican armed forces is their role
in national development, consisting essentially of
maintaining control of the intelligence community,
providing public services in rural communities, contai-
ning revolutionary movements, and halting trans-na-
tional organised crime27. To date, the growing influen-
ce of drugs and cartels in Mexico has had an impact
on the armed forces. Increasingly, the military is
being used to deter transnational organised crime
within Mexican borders. In fact, during the past three
years, almost the entire law enforcement apparatus
for combating drug trafficking has been replaced with
military soldiers, and numerous key political appoint-
ments and governmental positions have now been
 filled with Mexican generals and colonels28.
Therefore, although the Mexican democratisation pro-
cess would seem to signal a demise of the national
security state, the armed forces have remained faith-
ful to their old doctrine, obsessed with domestic or-
der, apathetic towards international trends, and oppo-
sed to PK participation. The idea of sending observers
in support of UN peace initiatives is not even openly
debated among the officer corps. As Roderic Camp
argues, ‘the military has not encouraged a free flow
of ideas, nor a natural exchange socially or otherwise
between the officer corps and the civilian leadership,
at least up through 2000’29.
Given these considerations, it was not surprising that
Mexico withdrew from the Rio Treaty (the Inter-Ame-
rican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) in 2001. While
this measure was uncontroversial in Mexico, it took
many of its allies, including the US and Latin America,
by surprise, since it was unilaterally announced wit-
hout previous consultation. The Rio Treaty binds the
signatory nations of the Western Hemisphere to pro-
tect the Americas from outside attack. The heart of
the Treaty is Article 3, which states that ‘an armed
attack by any State against an American [Western
Hemisphere] state shall be considered as an attack
against all the American States, and, consequently,
each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes
to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence.’30
Speaking to the OAS (the treaty’s depositary organi-
sation) in 2001 the then Mexican President Vicente
Fox called the Rio Treaty ‘useless’ and ‘obsolete’. 
Fox made a point: to some extent, the Treaty was
useless, since it was a rather ineffective protection
against Fidel Castro and often provided a legal justifi-
cation for US intervention in Latin America. However,
the reasons to withdraw were never appropriately dis-
cussed or justified by the Mexican government.
To date, Mexico is virtually outside all regional military
alliances and has not promoted an alternative to the
Rio mechanism. This has led many experts, including
the authors, to describe Mexico’s decision as maverick
and poorly informed. If the Treaty had become obso-
lete, then a reform initiative might have been in or-
der, but Mexico gave no signals to engage a reform
process within the TIAR. This move shows that Mexico
is rarely an initiative reformer, although its withdrawal
also puts in question its multilateral vocation.
With regards to PK, Mexico is still lagging way behind
its Latin America counterparts. Mexico has not been
able to provide blue helmets to UN PK missions since
1950, although it did deploy police officers to El Sal-
vador. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has made multi-
ple efforts to deploy troops, but the ultimate decision
on whether Mexico will join a UN force relies on two
strong federal bureaucracies, the Ministry of Defence
(the Army and the Air Force) and the Ministry of the
Navy. The armed forces, however, do not have a uni-
fied voice. The Navy, with more international exposu-
re than the Army, but with fewer personnel, supports
PK participation. A plan within the Navy has already
been devised to allow personnel from that military
branch to join a PK force31. Nevertheless, PK requires
intensive manpower that only large armies can provi-
de, and in this respect the Mexican Army has led the
opposition to such an engagement32.
The Army perceives peace operations as weakening
the military’s ability to respond to its primary dome-
stic roles. The reasons advanced by Army generals 
to abstain from joining a UN force are multiple: first,
it is argued that most Mexican soldiers do not fulfil
the foreign language requirements established by the
UN for observational posts, since mandatory English
courses have never been part of their curricula. Second,
there is a serious concern about over-stretching mis-
sions, when the military is already engaged in multi-
ple operations at home. Third, the military has shown
anxiety about an increased involvement of US military
forces in UN PK operations and regards diplomatic
 efforts as attempts to de-nationalise Mexico’s defence
strategy. Finally, there are questions about budgets
and PK associated costs, such as vaccines, uniforms,
gear, and equipment for the mission, none of which
are subsidised by the UN. As a result, Mexico’s com-
mitment to international PK is still determined by
 domestic forces, especially civil-military relations. 
The fact that the transition to democracy has not
been settled quite yet means that Mexico is still not
able to contribute troops to international endeavours.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Another area where Mexico has retrenched somehow
from the UN system is nuclear disarmament. Mexico
played a leading role in promoting global and regional
nuclear non-proliferation by establishing the first nu-
clear-weapon-free zone in the world, also known as
the Treaty of Tlatelolco, for which Mexico’s UN Am-
bassador Alfonso García Robles shared a Nobel peace
prize in 1982 with Sweden’s Ava Myrdal33. Yet, the
former regional leader on non-proliferation has not
been able to articulate a coherent and comprehensive
policy towards nuclear disarmament since the end of
the Cold War. The options for Mexico have narrowed
somehow, since the agenda is now clearly dominated
by the UNSC, while the UN Disarmament Conference
in Geneva has been paralysed since the 1990s. It is
not clear how Mexico can now use its prominent role
on nuclear disarmament in the UN, unless it plays a
more active role in the UNSC, too.
Consequently, Mexico is more likely to operate as an
economic actor, providing funds to finance several UN
activities. Mexico might someday assume more roles,
using its military power to support peace and stability,
but much will depend on domestic factors, as well as on
the availability of appropriate international conditions.
Hard and Soft Power Influence
Similarly, Mexico rarely uses its economic hard power
to influence other countries, even though it is one 
of Latin America’s most important economic forces. 
It does not impose conditionality terms on trade or
 investment, nor does it offer or negotiate special in-
vestment benefits for Mexican multinationals. Mexico
has the largest concentration of multinationals in
 Latin America, who invest heavily in the region, such
as Bimbo, Televisa, Telmex, and Cemex. This has often
caused tension with Mexican companies, such as
 Cemex, the world’s largest cement company, because
the business sector often feels its interests are not 
well defended or protected by Mexico’s foreign policy,
especially when dealing with countries that have threa-
tened to nationalise Mexican companies abroad, such
as Venezuela.
Instead, Mexico seems to emphasise its soft power,
not only as a good international citizen and multilate-
ral country, but also as a major exporter of culture.
Mexico is more widely known for its television pro-
grammes (also known as telenovelas) and cultural
heritage, which it proudly showcases around the
world. The country’s renowned artists, from Diego
 Rivera to Frida Kahlo, and its diverse gastronomy
have increased Mexico’s image as a cultural power. 
It is partly because of this reputation, that Mexico is
the largest recipient of tourism in Latin America and
one the top ten sites for world tourism. Unfortunate-
ly, the Mexican government is less capable of trans-
forming such power resources into concrete govern-
mental actions in the area of global governance.
 Mexico’s soft power thus remains just soft.
Mexico City: massive urbanization is one of the great




Traditionally, Mexico has sought to be a recipient of aid
to help address its own problems of poverty, inequali-
ty, and social and economic exclusion. However, since
its accession to the OECD in 1994, Mexico has received
less aid and has now become a net aid donor.
Mexican international assistance is largely limited to
international humanitarian assistance, particularly
within Latin America as a whole, and especially to
Central America and the Caribbean. This pattern of
international humanitarian assistance reflects Mexi-
co’s interests in the region. It is a very powerful
country relative to its Southern neighbours, and is 
to a large extent one among equals within South
America. The amount of aid provided so far is still
very small, totalling less than US$ 80 million from
2000-2006. Instead, Mexico has offered technical
 assistance and human expertise, deploying engineers
and technicians to natural disaster areas.
Recently, it has provided humanitarian assistance
with the deployment of Navy officers. The first of
 these was in early 2005 to aid the victims of the
 Tsunami disaster in Southeast Asia. This was then
followed by the deployment to Mississippi to assist 
in relief operations in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.
This type of aid is rarely quantified, but it involves
human resources which the Mexican government 
has financed.
Within Latin America, Mexico is most willing to assu-
me wide ranging leadership responsibilities in Central
America and the Caribbean, most notably through its
Plan Puebla-Panama. It is less willing to act as a lea-
der within South America, where its power is balan-
ced by that of Brazil. 
Indeed, perhaps the most important regional coope-
rative initiative that Mexico has carried out is the Plan
Puebla-Panama. Proposed by Mexico’s President Vicente
Fox in 2001, it attempts to foster economic develop-
ment across the Mesoamerican region to increase
integration, extending from Puebla in Mexico, to Pana-
ma in Central America. The Plan includes projects grou-
ped into eight initiatives designed to increase the
competitiveness of the region. The Plan Puebla-Pana-
ma is the foremost Mexican cooperative initiative in
the region. Its plan projects aim to work with existing
regional and international institutions, such as the IDB
and the WB for financing and im plementation. The Plan
is complementary to the economic development work
done by the international economic institutions. Never-
theless, the lack of development funds to finance such
an ambitious project has halted its full implementation.
The construction of highways, airports and develop-
ment infrastructure is still way behind schedule. Not to
mention the fact that narcotics and crime in the whole
region have  diverted many of the funds that were
otherwise  destined for development.
Likewise, Mexico’s ambivalent role in Latin America
fosters an equally ambivalent opinion among Mexi-
cans. Surveys indicate that the public is not convin-
ced about the desirability of a plan to promote the
development of southern neighbours, if this entails
fewer resources for the development of other regions
in Mexico. In 2004, only 36 per cent of Mexicans said
that providing aid to Central America would benefit
the country a lot or somewhat, while 55 per cent said
it would benefit the country only a little or not at all.
Surprisingly, even Mexicans living in the South and
Southeast were not convinced that it would benefit
Mexico, only 37 per cent said that Mexico would
 benefit a lot or somewhat, while 48 per cent said 
the benefits would be little or none. In 2006, when
asked how strongly they believed that Mexico should
provide economic resources to help develop the
 countries of Central America, only 24 per cent said 
a great deal, while 22 per cent said somewhat, 31 
per cent said not very much, and 15 per cent said 
not at all34.
VALUE SYSTEM
Mexico’s value systems and legal and social systems
are Western and liberal in origin. As such, most of the
values of the world’s traditional powers are shared by
Mexico. Mexico differs from many Western countries
in its explicit non-interventionist, pacific foreign poli-
cy, which in some ways has a greater resemblance to
Chinese non-interventionism and Japanese pacifism
than to that of the United States or Western Europe.
However, not all Asian countries are non-interventio-
nist, nor are they all fierce defenders of the pacific
resolution of conflicts. To the extent that the rise of
‘Asian values’ is a significant force in the globalisation
process, Mexico is a firm defender of the Western
 values of democracy and liberalism.
Mexico is living an historic moment in which significant
changes in the work of organisational systems are
 taking place. Therefore, the debate about Mexican
 values becomes important, and even more so because
many Mexican multinational firms have started intro-
ducing changes in their organisations that attempt 
to take into account and adapt to the values and
 behaviours of Asian countries receiving their export
products.
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Furthermore, the country also has a very heteroge -
neous population that constantly questions Western
values. For decades, there has been a stereotype
 related to the Mexican ‘essence’, which was strongly
identified with the Mexican Revolution in the 1930s.
In fact, most literary essays, philosophical reflections
and studies about the character and psychology of
the Mexican ‘essence’ focused on cultural practices
performed mainly by the Mexican working class and
mestizos and not so much by European Mexicans. The
social revolt of the Zapatista movement in the 1990s
questioned some of these European values and raised
concerns about the significance of globalisation over-
all. After all, the Zapatista movement made itself pu-
blic the same day NAFTA entered into force. To date,
many intellectuals from the political left question Me-
xico’s position in North America and have advocated 
a more Latin American or non-Western foreign policy.
However, this has not translated into a clear non-
 Western policy, in part because the political left is still
part of the opposition, as it has never won elections
at the executive federal level.
The most important normative criteria influencing
 Mexico’s actions at the international level are those
enshrined in the Constitution: the self-determination
of peoples and nations, non-intervention in the inter-
nal affairs of other states, the pacific resolution of
conflicts, the prohibition of the threat or use of force
in international relations, the sovereign equality of
states, international cooperation for development,
and the struggle for peace and international security.
In addition to these codified criteria, the current go-
vernment and the previous four governments have all
included an explicit endorsement of the desirability of
free and open markets, or economic liberalism, as the
best means to achieve increased welfare. Since Mexi-
co has seen the arrival of democracy in 2000, political
liberalism has also stood behind Mexico’s rhetoric and
actions to shape the globalisation process.
CONCLUSIONS
The preceding sections have offered an ample view
containing economic and political factors which might
impinge on Mexico’s role as an active G5 country.
There is no doubt that Mexico faces a large number
of obstacles, including a broad sense of scepticism
and ambivalence among the public with regard to the
form of foreign policy that the country should exerci-
se. Will Mexico become a major player in the interna-
tional system? Is Mexico a reliable emerging power?
The answer lies in three evolving and related circum-
stances.
First, while Mexico has behaved essentially as a very
responsible actor within the international system for
several decades, the US continues to be of such over-
riding importance for Mexican diplomacy, that very
little thought is given to its role as a middle power in
the global system. Mexico’s external behaviour is thus
restrained by the fact that it interacts in a region im-
mersed with large asymmetries of power and econo-
mic interdependence. The extent to which Mexico will
assume an active role in world affairs will depend on
how the political leadership defines its relationship
vis-à-vis Washington.
Second, contrary to countries like Brazil, Mexico’s
 foreign policy does not pursue a regional hegemonic
role. Given its particular geographic location, midway
between the North and the South, Mexican diplomacy
finds it particularly difficult to articulate a regional
leadership role. Instead, it will attempt to portray
 itself as a bridge between the rich and the poor, the
North and the South. Yet, even this role is limited by
the fact that other countries must legitimise and ac-
cept such function. To date, there are few signs that
countries in the South or in Latin America will view
Mexico as a channel or bridge to the North.
Third, the extent to which Mexico can assume a lead-
ership role in economic and political governance also
depends on how it handles its own domestic transiti-
on. The country has not fully graduated from its recent
democratisation experience, and several key actors
have yet to understand and assimilate the conseque -
ces of the transition to democracy. Democratisation
trends have been affected by a number of factors,
 including military reserve domains and bureaucratic
pressures, all of which exercise an influence on Mexi-
co’s commitment to international organisations and
global governance.
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